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If Germany would like to play a more active role in international affairs, improving the 
country’s international humanitarian aid efforts should be top on the list. Working 
toward deeper European integration in this field would boost its own profile.  
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In the field of humanitarian assistance, Germany punches below its weight. Be it in absolute 
terms ($757 million, for sixth place in 2013), be it as a share of total international 
humanitarian aid (5.9 percent, behind countries such as Turkey and Sweden), be it in terms of 
humanitarian aid provided per citizen ($9, for 15th place), be it as a total share of its total 
official development assistance (5.4 percent, for 22nd place), or be it as a percentage of its 
gross national income (0.02 percent), Germany never makes it to the top of humanitarian aid 
tables. However, as a recent IP-Forsa poll suggested, a vast majority of those supporting a 
more active German role in international affairs believes Germany should gear up its 
humanitarian assistance efforts. How would that work, and how best to go about it? 
Greater strategic emphasis on humanitarian aid could compensate for the limited leverage that 
Germany can muster in military affairs – especially vis-à-vis France and the United Kingdom. 
The Nordic countries have been following this approach for some time quite successfully, 
albeit on a more limited scale. Within this context, the further europeanization of German 
humanitarian assistance would make a lot of sense. Indeed, this could shield aid from being 
provided solely according to foreign policy considerations, while also enhancing the 
efficiency of the German humanitarian system itself. 
There are various ways to more deeply integrate German humanitarian aid efforts into 
European structures. To begin with, those with stakes in humanitarian assistance could push 
for a stronger relationship between German and European policy makers. To do so, the chair 
of the Bundestag's human rights and humanitarian aid committee could initiate regular 
meetings with its counterpart in the European Parliament. German MPs from the committee 
could also informally approach their peers in the EP on an ad hoc basis. 
As a second step, Germany’s humanitarian NGOs could seek the advantages of scale that 
europeanization would offer. While the Association of German Humanitarian NGOs 
(VENRO) acts as a service provider to humanitarian NGOs within Germany, individual 
NGOs do not have the human and financial resources to do something similar in Brussels. 
Pooling resources into a “European branch” of VENRO could beef up the existing European 
platform of humanitarian NGOs (VOICE), with stronger input from Germany. 
In addition, greater europeanization of the humanitarian modus operandi could shield 
humanitarian NGOs from potentially unwarranted political interference. To do so, Germany’s 
Foreign Office could draw inspiration from the EU's Framework Partnership Agreements and 
provide regular annual funding to humanitarian NGOs, as opposed to the current crisis-
specific funding mechanisms. The establishment of a financing desk for humanitarian NGOs 
to help these obtain funding from Brussels would also help emancipate humanitarian NGOs 
from the Foreign Office. 
Furthermore, opportunities for horizontal policy transmission on a European scale could be 
better exploited. Within such an understanding, VENRO could be provided with the necessary 
resources to establish and sustain a regular policy dialogue with its counterparts in other EU 
member states. At the same time, the Foreign Office could hire external consultants or set up 
a permanent position to systematically establish and sustain policy exchanges with the 
humanitarian task forces of other European foreign ministries. 
Last but not least, the europeanization of the intellectual input available to German 
humanitarian stakeholders could bring long-term benefits. In order to reap these, the 
establishment of a single German humanitarian institute forging institutionalized links with 
cutting-edge research centers in other European countries would be an important step. Groupe 
URD in Paris, PRIO in Oslo, and London's Overseas Development Institute would be natural 
partners in this endeavor. 
Adopting such strategies to amplify its humanitarian aid efforts would tangibly exemplify 
Germany’s willingness to play a more active role on the international stage. Through the 
initiatives outlined above, German stakeholders would have the opportunity to raise the 
profile of humanitarian issues both at home and abroad. Above all, the europeanization of 
humanitarian aid presents new opportunities for Germany well worth exploring. 
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